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This study analyzes the impact of the Canadian Agriculture Income Stabilization (CAIS) 
program.  The study begins with a specification of dynamic crop production that 
decomposes static short run crop acreage allocation decisions and dynamic crop yield 
affects.  The modelling framework accommodates risk aversion, price uncertainty, and 
applies recent aggregation theory to aggregate weather data.  Using this framework an 
analytical model of the impacts of CAIS on crop production is developed.  Hypothetical 
impacts of are simulated using an aggregate Manitoba data set. The results show that 
CAIS has a substantial impact on the shadow prices of both inputs and outputs. These 
shadow price effects resulted in a 4 percent increase in long run wheat and barley 
yields and a 2 percent increase for canola.  CAIS has a small impact on nominal wealth 
but the impacts depend on the properties of producers’ risk preferences.  With constant 







      
Decoupling government support from agricultural production has become an 
important policy issue at both national and international levels. As one of the key principles 
of agricultural policy reform adopted by OECD Ministers in 1987, policies deemed to have 
minor impact on production and trade would not lead to discipline. The complexities of the 
decoupling issue are well described in an OECD conceptual overview (Anton, OECD 2001), 
and this provides the analytical framework for on-going OECD research on decoupling.  
      
The OECD overview notes that policy can affect production and trade by the 
following types of mechanisms: static effects under risk neutrality; static effects under risk 
aversion and uncertainty; and dynamic effects related to investment decisions.  Previous 
empirical research on the effects of policy on production and trade has focused on static 
effects under risk neutrality, emphasizing (e.g.) changes in expected output prices.   
However under risk aversion and uncertainty, price neutral  policies can influence 
production through changes in price or  revenue uncertainty and changes in exogenous 
income, and these  effects may be substantial (e.g. Hennessy). The effects of such  
policies on production and trade should be most important in a dynamic setting: uncertainty 
and hence risk aversion are more important over a long planning horizon than in a static 
model, and investment decisions have long lasting effects on production.  
      
The first phase of OECD research stemming from the overview emphasized static 
models under risk aversion and uncertainty (e.g. Sckokai 2002). The second phase of the 
research emphasized dynamic models of investment under risk aversion and uncertainty.  
This included an extension of the Italian static model to dynamics (Sckokai 2005) and a 
dynamic econometric model of Manitoba crop investment (Coyle 2005). For example, the 
Manitoba study estimated a dynamic model of investment in machinery and equipment 
aggregated over all crops, since investment data is not available for individual crops.  
      
However the drawback of this approach, focussing on aggregate investment, is that 
it does not provide crop specific estimates of dynamic impacts. Thus it cannot readily be 
compared with estimates of static impacts on crop specific acreage demands. In addition, 
dynamic impacts on investment are only one component (albeit a critical component) in 
dynamic changes in crop production (other components are impacts of investment on yield 
and changes in crop acreages).  
      
This study adopts an alternative approach to specification of dynamic crop 
production models: crop production is decomposed into a static short run crop acreage 
allocation model (conditional on yields) and dynamic crop yield models. This approach 
permits the estimation of short run impacts of price and programs on output (primarily 






yields and acreages).  
      
The model is dynamic (an autoregressive distributed lag model), accommodates risk 
aversion and price uncertainty, and applies recent aggregation theory to aggregate weather 
data. In contrast, previous econometric studies of price impacts on yields have been limited 
to static risk neutral models, and estimated impacts have often been statistically 
insignificant.  
      
This applies this methodology to a more complex econometric model of Manitoba 
crop production. Econometric results are used to simulate possible crop production impacts 
of the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program.  Crop production impacts 
provide a first order approximation to trade distorting impacts on CAIS, assuming effects on 
Canadian consumption are negligible.  
      
A simple analytical model of the impacts of CAIS on crop production is developed 
here. Assuming utility maximizing behaviour under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), 
the analytical model is quite different from standard models. This is especially the case in 
its treatment of shadow prices and changes in relative wealth. Calculations suggest that 
impacts of CAIS on agricultural production and trade distortions may be significant, but 
important caveats must qualify these hypothetical results.  
 
2.0 MANITOBA  DATA 
The empirical models depend upon the following data for  Manitoba (obtained 
primarily from the Manitoba Agriculture  Yearbook 2002): annual production and harvested 
acres for major  crops (wheat, barley, canola, oats, rye, flax), market prices for  crops, 
operating costs and capital costs per acre for different  crops, fertilizer sales, value per acre 
of farmland and  buildings. Farm input price indexes for Western Canada were obtained for 
hired labour, variable crop inputs, and machinery plus equipment (Manitoba Agriculture 
Yearbook, Statistics Canada).  
      
Data on government payments, premiums etc. were obtained  from the following 
agencies or their publications: Manitoba Crop  Insurance Corporation (MCIC), Net Income 
Stabilization Account  program (NISA), Agriculture Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA),  
Gross Revenue Insurance program (GRIP), Western Grains  Stabilization Act program 
(WGSA), Western Grains Transportation  Act program (WGTA). Data on other programs 
was obtained from Agriculture Economic Statistics (Statistics Canada 26-603).  
      
An annual crop-growth weather index GRODEX (Dyer, Narayanan and Murray) is a 
proxy for weather, and is available for 1961- 87 for six Manitoba weather stations, and by a 
similar index  constructed by the Canadian Wheat Board for 1981-95 for various  weather 






total precipitation for May-July for twenty one Manitoba weather stations over 1982-2002.    
      
Initial wealth is defined as the sum of value of capital stock in crop production 
(machinery and equipment plus land and buildings) minus related debts. A perusal of 
historical data (not broken down for crops and livestock) on value of machinery and 
equipment, value of land and buildings and outstanding farm debt indicates that the value 
of land and buildings greatly exceeds the other two series, and the other two series largely 
cancel out. For example, in 2000 the value of land and buildings was $9,782 million, value 
of machinery and equipment was $3,315 million, and total debt was $3,735 million 
(Manitoba Agriculture Yearbook, 2002).  The value of land and buildings in crop agriculture 
is a proxy for initial wealth. This is calculated from total crop acres and the value per acre of 
farmland and buildings for Manitoba. Initial wealth also includes various government 
payments for crops that are not commodity specific.  
      
Expected market prices for crops are proxied as a one year lag on prices, pt-1. Net 
expected prices include lagged payments minus premiums for Crop Insurance and GRIP, 
and also transportation costs net of subsidies. Variances and covariances of market price 
are calculated as a simple three year weighted average of observed prediction errors: 
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   (1) 
This simple naive model of expectations has been used in many studies (e.g. 
Chavas and Holt 1990).  Moreover such models have performed better than rational 
expectations models in studies of Western Canadian agriculture (Coyle 1992, 1999; Mbaga 
and Coyle) (also see Sulewski, Spriggs and Schoney). A covariance between market prices 
and various government payments is defined similarly:  
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This is designed to capture an insurance/income smoothing effect rather than a 
wealth effect of government payments. So this excludes, for example, deposits to NISA 
savings accounts, which are contributions to wealth rather than to current expenditures. It 
includes withdrawals from NISA accounts, which are used to smooth expenditures.  
      
Note that we do not adopt a truncation approach to the effect of programs on price 
distributions used in studies such as Chavas and Holt. These authors assumed a naive 
model of expectations for market prices similar to (1), and then truncated the distribution in 
terms of one parameter (floor price for the commodity). However in our case the truncation 
process seems more complex since multiple programs imply multiple truncation 
parameters. Moreover it is not clear that producers adopting a naive expectations process 
for market prices would adopt or approximate such a sophisticated truncation process for 
effects   of programs on price distributions. Instead we assume simply that producers adopt 
a naive expectations process regarding market prices and how market prices covary with 
government payments.  Moreover by modeling these as separate processes we can test if 
they have different impacts on investment and production decisions. Thus we can test if 
government programs have a separate insurance effect on investment and production.  
      
An annual time series variance for weather is constructed for each weather station 
as a similar three year weighted average of prediction errors (1) in weather station data. 
Then the time series variance data for each weather station are combined into a weighted 
average variance series for Manitoba (weather stations are weighted based on crop district 
wheat production in 1985).  This weighted average time series weather variance is used as 
a proxy for weather uncertainty in Manitoba in crop acreage allocation model. 
 




Yield equations are specified here as conditional on prices but not on capital stock, 
i.e. capital is not included as an explanatory variable in yield equations since capital or 
investment data is not crop specific. Thus estimated price and program effects implicitly 
include indirect impacts through induced changes in capital. In other words, estimated price 
effects on yields include direct effects of prices on yields (at constant capital stocks) plus 
indirect effects on yields associated with effects of prices on capital stock.  
      
Crop yields are modelled here as a function of expected price and price variance, 
initial wealth and weather. Assuming disjoint technologies (and similar capital/acreage 
ratios across crops), crop yield can be modelled independently of cross price effects.  
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The normalization (Ep/w, Vp/w
2, W
0/w) is implied by constant relative risk aversion. Here 
Eω and Vω are the cross section mean and variance of weather station data for three 
periods j: GRODEX weather index (1961-1980), CWB weather index (1981-1995), and 
May-July precipitation (1996-2002) (weather stations are weighted based on crop district 
wheat production). The choice of an ADL model and the specification of weather variables 
in (3) is explained in the accompanying paper (Coyle 2006).    
 
3.2 Econometric Results for Manitoba  
      
The unit root hypothesis was strongly rejected for yield of each crop, using standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. Since I(1) and I(0) explanatory variables 
generally  imply an I(1) dependent variable, this suggests that all  variables are I(0). 
Consequently the regression model is estimated in levels rather than as first differences. 
The model is specified as log-linear, so all coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.  
 
Ep includes crop specific government payments and charges (primarily related to 
Crop Insurance and GRIP) and an index of net transportation costs. A crop input price 
index is the numeraire w, and other input prices (hired farm labour wage, a capital price 
index) were statistically insignificant. 
 
Here we discuss results for models of wheat yield, since this is the major crop. OLS 
estimates of a risk neutral ADL model with a four period lag in Ep are presented in Table A-
1 of the Appendix on ADL Crop Yield Models. The sum of lag coefficients for Ep is +0.629 
with a t-ratio of 2.68 under polynomial restrictions (Table A-1 column a). The Durbin-h 
statistic indicates zero autocorrelation, and the polynomial restrictions are not rejected. R
2 






misspecification. Results are almost identical dropping the polynomial restrictions (Table A-
1 column B)
 
The risk averse ADL model (3) was initially specified with 8 period lags for Ep,Vp,W
0 
(and fourth degree polynomials to  preserve degrees of freedom). Significance of lags was 
tested for related models without polynomial restrictions. Results indicated these models 
could be reduced to four period lags, and that lagged yield was statistically insignificant.  
      
Table A-2 reports results for the selected model under second degree polynomial 
restrictions. The sum of lag coefficients and corresponding t-ratios are +0.637 (2.27), 
-0.115 (2.45), +0.602 (3.58) for Ep, Vp, W
0 respectively for OLS (Table A-2 column A). Four 
of the six weather variables are statistically significant, and these have the anticipated 
signs. R
2 is 0.876 and the polynomial restrictions are accepted, but there is autocorrelation. 
Table A-2 column B reports results for a grid search maximum likelihood GLS procedure 
(Beach and MacKinnon). Sum of lag coefficients are similar to the OLS case: +0.572 (3.16), 
-0.125 (3.70), +0.567 (4.36) for Ep, Vp, W
0.  
      
Since this and the accompanying paper are the first econometric studies of dynamic 
price impacts on crop yields, these results cannot be assessed relative to other studies.  
Nevertheless, the estimated elasticity of wheat yield with respect to initial wealth is larger 
than anticipated. This estimate will be critical in calculating potential impacts of CAIS on 
production.  
      
The effects of omitting weather variables or economic variables from this model are 
illustrated in Table A-3. Omitting   weather variables (and the statistically insignificant time 
trend), Ep and Vp are no longer statistically significant (Table A-3). R
2 for OLS estimation is 
0.8763, 0.6847 and 0.6978 for the full model (A-2 column A), omission of weather (A-3 
column A) and omission of economic variables (Table A-3 column B). (The corresponding 
adjusted R
2 is 0.7971, 0.5960 and 0.6356.) Thus the economic variables explain as much 
of the variation in annual wheat crop yield as does weather (and time trend).  
      
The covariance between government payments and wheat market prices was also 
included in the model. This is denoted as Cov(Gp1) and is normalized by w
2. First an 8 
period lag in Cov(Gp1) was added to model (3), using 4 period lags in Ep,Vp,W
0.  Results 
are presented in Table A-4 using a fourth degree polynomial for the 8 period lag and a 
second degree polynomial for the 4 period lags. For OLS sum of lag coefficients and 
t-ratios are +0.489 (1.77), -0.065 (1.32), +0.644 (3.53), -0.0012 (1.90) for Ep, Vp, V
0, 
Cov(Gp1)  (Table A-4 Column A). R
2 is 0.913 and the polynomial restrictions are accepted, 
but there is autocorrelation. For GLS, sum of lag coefficients and t-ratios are +0.415 (2.95), 
-0.068 (2.38), +0.463 (3.51) for Ep, Vp, W
0 and -0.0009 (2.89) for Cov(Gp1). Thus the 
insurance effect Cov(Gp1) has a statistically significant impact on wheat yield as 






      
Rather than adopting a full general to specific testing for a preferred model given Ep, 
Vp, W
0, Cov(Gp1), a yield model was specified given the same lag lengths and polynomial 
restrictions   for Ep, Vp, W
0 as was selected for the ADL investment equation: 2  period lag 
for Ep, 1 period lag for Vp, and a 4 period lag for  W
0. Then testing indicated a 3 period lag 
for Cov(Gp1), in  contrast to a lag for periods (3,4) in the investment model.  Results are 
reported in Table A-5. OLS estimates and t-ratios of sum of lags are +0.531 (2.14), -0.045 
(1.54), +0.432 (2.92), -0.050 (1.80) for Ep, Vp, W
0, Cov(Gp1)  (Table A-5 Column A). R
2 is 
.859 and polynomial restrictions are not rejected at the 0.05 level, but there is 
autocorrelation. GLS estimates correcting for autocorrelation are reported in Table A-5.  
GLS estimates of sum of lags are +0.383 (2.79), -0.043 (2.66), +0.263 (2.95), -0.036 (2.43) 
for Ep, Vp, W
0, Cov(Gp1). Note that the elasticity of the insurance effect is larger in 
magnitude than in Table A-4.  
      
Appendix A on ADL crop yields also reports econometric results for barley, canola 
and oats. For barley, results for risk neutral models and simple risk averse models (with Ep, 
Vp, W
0) were similar to wheat (Tables A-6 and A-7), but Cov(Gp2) was not statistically 
significant. For canola, a period 3 lag on Ep and a period 4 lag on Vp were statistically 
significant, instead of distributed lags (Table A-8). W
0 and Cov(Gp3) were statistically 
insignificant. For oats, only a period 9 lag on Ep was statistically significant (Tables A-9 and 
A-10).  
      
We cannot have much confidence in the estimated elasticities of yield with respect to 
wealth, which will be critical in simulating impacts of CAIS. There are no comparable 
studies, since other studies of price effects on yields have estimated static risk neutral 
models (and generally obtained insignificant results). A dynamic ADL model of Manitoba 
investment in crop machinery and equipment under risk aversion led to similar magnitudes 
for estimated elasticity of investment with respect to wealth (Coyle 2005).  
      
Nevertheless we suspect that this study overestimates elasticity of wheat and barley 
yields with respect to wealth. An elasticity of +0.20 lies within the 95 % confidence interval 
about the reported estimates of +0.4322 and +0.4395 for wheat and barley yields (Table A-
5 column A and A-7 column A). This may well be more realistic than the reported 
estimates.  
      
We also briefly considered ADL yield models conditional on capital stocks. The 
difficulty is that investment/capital data is not crop specific, unlike yields. Yield models for 
individual crops can be estimated conditional on total capital per acre, but this assumes that 
capital per acre is approximately equal across crops. This is presumably an unrealistic 
assumption, although similar capital requirements per acre are often assumed in MDA 
budget forecasts for different crops.  






An alternative approach is to specify a yield model, using a Tornqvist index1 for 
yields, as conditional on capital per acre.  Here yield is defined as a Tornqvist index of crop 
outputs relative to crop acres. Although this approach does not impose identical capital 
requirements per acre over crops, there is a loss of information in aggregating outputs over 
crops.  Correlations between the Tornqvist index for yields and individual crop yields are 
relatively high (+0.919, +0.954, +0.925 for wheat, barley and oats, respectively). 
Nevertheless, econometric results for such an ADL model are weaker than (e.g.) an ADL 
wheat yield model. This presumably reflects errors in aggregation of outputs.  
 
4.0 CROP ACREAGE ALLOCATION MODEL 
 
4.1 Introduction  
      
Our econometric results for ADL yield models suggest that crop yields are 
essentially independent of price expectations within the current year. Indeed this 
assumption underlies most empirical studies of crop acreage demands.  
                                                 
1 Tornqvist index is a discrete approximation to a continuous Divisia index which is a weighted sum of the growth 
rates of the various components The weights are shares of total value. With a Tornqvist index the growth rates are 
defined as the difference in natural logarithms of successive observations of the components and the weights are 
equal to the mean of the factor shares of the components in the corresponding pair of years. 
      
Here we focus on the allocation of total crop acres among individual crops, i.e. we 
model crop acreage decisions conditional on total crop acres. This necessarily implies that 
crop acreage demand depends on cross prices, but this is likely to be the case even if we 
do not adopt such a specification, since total cropland is largely quasi-fixed. Moreover there 
are two major advantages to such a specification: adding-up restrictions lead to more 
precise estimates (Coyle 1993), and the model presumably is largely static rather than 
dynamic (predetermined yields and total crop acres reflect dynamic processes). In addition 
by specifying a static model, we can more readily interpret measured impacts of Ep and Vp 
as a response to specified expectations, i.e. we do not have the complex   identification 
problem of disentangling lags in expectations and lags in response as in dynamic ADL 
models.  
      
A four crop acreage allocation model is considered: wheat, barley, canola and other 
crops (oats, rye, flax). Crop acreage allocation models generally treat price uncertainty in 
an ad hoc manner in the case of multiple crops and ignore yield uncertainty in the case of 
aggregate (macro) data. Since these are serious misspecifications, we attempt to deal with 
them here.  Construction of a time series representative farm level weather variance VW is 
discussed in the accompanying paper (Coyle 2006).    Price uncertainty and predetermined 
yields lead to a relatively simple Tornqvist type index of aggregate variance of revenues per 






three commodities and  other crops. These are included in the acreage demand model 
along with revenue per acre variances and covariances between the three commodities, 
constructed similarly to (1).  
 
4.2 Econometric Results for Manitoba 
      
The crop acreage allocation model is specified most generally as: 
(4) 
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The dependent variables are crop acreage shares szi (= zi/Z).  Here Eri denotes expected 
revenues per acre (r = p yld) for wheat, barley and canola, r4 is a Tornqvist revenue per 
acre index for other crops, Vrij is variance or covariance in revenues per acre for wheat, 
barley and canola, VR4 is the aggregate variance in revenues per acre index for other 
crops, VRi4 is the aggregate covariance index for crop i (wheat, barley, canola) with other 
crops 4. The normalization of Vr by (Er4)
2 corresponds to constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA). Under CRRA, the separate term Er4 should drop out of the model. W0 is initial 
wealth, w1 and w2 are farm price indexes for variable crop inputs and hired labour, Z is total 
crop acreage, d is a dummy variable for the 1970 LIFT program, and t is a time trend. 
Change in total crop acreage Zt-Zt-1 is included in the model since acreage demands may 
depend on lags in adjustment of the overall crop rotation (Coyle 1993). VWi is the time 
series representative farm  level weather variance constructed from GRODEX weather 
station  index data (1961-1984), CWB weather station index data (1985- 1995), and annual 
May-July weather station precipitation data  (1996-2002), respectively. Management data 
on operating costs per acre for different crops (Manitoba Agricultural Yearbook) was also 
considered but did not improve the empirical model. All price variables (except for 
covariances, which are negative as well as positive) are specified as logarithms. Under risk 
neutrality the model reduces to: 
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A standard approach is to estimate crop share equations as a system of seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR). However we emphasize single equation methods of 






one equation are generally biased and inconsistent under specification errors in any other 
equation (except for identical regressors, which is unlikely in a final model omitting 
insignificant variables). So, single equation methods are more robust.   
      
Unit root hypotheses were tested using standard augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests, and an alternative test due to Kwiatkowski et.al. Results were 
ambiguous for the key  variables crop shares. So it was decided to consider Durbin- 
Watson (DW) statistics from OLS estimates of equations in levels.  DW statistics are often 
recommended as an additional indicator of unit roots. Indeed in simple unit root models the 
DW statistic converges asymptotically to 0 (Phillips 1986). OLS estimates in levels 
generally indicated DW statistics of approximately 2 for wheat and canola share equations, 
but lower DW statistics for   barley equations. Consequently it was concluded that wheat 
and canola share equations can be estimated in levels, but as a precaution barley share 
equations should be estimated with all variables in first differences.  
      
Single equation OLS estimates for wheat acreage share equations are presented in 
Table B-1 of the Appendix B on crop acreage demands. OLS estimates of the risk averse 
model (4), omitting insignificant variables of no direct interest here, are presented in Table 
B-2 column B. Coefficient estimates and t-ratios are +0.105 (2.04), -0.016 (2.35), and 
-0.158 (3.65) for Er1, Vr1 and W0, respectively, and + 0.016 (2.67) for VW2. Opposite 
coefficient signs for W0 and VW2 are expected, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA). Then an increase in W0 leads to a reduction in risk aversion, whereas an increase 
in VW2 implies an increase in risk. The negative coefficient of the LIFT dummy in the wheat 
equation is expected (payments were made for every 1969 wheat acre taken out of 
production in 1970). The Durbin-Watson statistic 1.83 indicates low autocorrelation. R
2 is 
0.8677.  
      
The own price elasticity for wheat is similar to results in an earlier study of Manitoba 
under risk neutrality (Coyle 1993).  The elasticity of response with respect to wealth is 
similar to results for winter wheat (-0.448) in a multi-crop model for Ontario (von Massow 
and Weersink), but the own price (expected revenue) elasticity of response is much larger 
than here (+0.911). Given differences in relative importance of wheat in the two provinces, 
perhaps these results suggest that the elasticity of response in wealth is overestimated 
here for Manitoba.  
      
OLS estimates of the corresponding risk neutral equation are presented in Table B-1 
column B. The DW statistic falls to 0.95 and the R
2 falls to 0.6513. OLS estimates of the 
corresponding risk averse model, but omitting weather uncertainty, are presented in Table 
B-1column C. R
2 falls to 0.8170 (adjusted R
2 falls from .8063 to .7579)  and DW statistic is 
1.79 .  
      






variables are first differenced. The final model deleting various insignificant coefficients is 
presented in Table B-2 column A. The estimated coefficient of Er2 is +0.102 (2.58), but Vr2 
and W0 are insignificant at +0.0001 (0.02) and +0.0067 (0.30). R
2 is .380 and the DW 
statistic is 1.45. When this equation is estimated in levels, R
2 is .548 and DW statistic is 
1.12. A grid search maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate first order 
autocorrelation, and GLS is applied (Table B-2: column B). However coefficients of Vr2 and 
W0 remain statistically insignificant. OLS estimates of the corresponding model under risk 
neutrality and omitting weather uncertainty are also presented in Table B-2 column C.  
      
Single equation OLS estimates of canola acreage share equations are presented in 
Table B-3. The final model deleting various insignificant coefficients is presented in Table 
B-3 column A. OLS coefficient estimates are +0.099 (6.67), -0.0052 (2.43), -0.018   (0.91) 
and -0.0056 (2.49) for Er3, Vr3, W0 and VW2, respectively.  R
2 is .9848 and DW statistic is 
2.02. For the corresponding risk neutral model, R
2 is .9689 and DW statistic is 1.76 (Table 
3B).  For the corresponding model omitting weather uncertainty, R
2 is 0.9803 and DW 
statistic is 2.05.  
      
Then the three acreage share equations for wheat, barley and canola are estimated 
as a system by SUR. The wheat and canola equations are specified as levels, but the 
barley equation is specified in first differences for all variables. SUR estimates for the above 
final models are presented in Table B-4. Any contemporaneous covariance in disturbances 
for this specification of the model is weak, since the hypothesis of a diagonal covariance 
matrix is not rejected at the .01 level using the Breusch-Pagan LM test. Coefficient 
estimates are similar to the above single equation results. SUR estimates of the 
corresponding risk neutral model and the model omitting weather uncertainty are presented 
in Tables B-5 and B-6, respectively. Reciprocity (symmetry) conditions implied by static 
competitive profit maximization and predetermined yields (Coyle 1993) are rejected.  
      
CRRA implies that the separate term Er4 can be dropped from each equation. The 
corresponding joint hypothesis is βi4 = 0 i=1,2,3 . This hypothesis is not rejected at the .05 
level for the SUR model. Thus the hypothesis of CRRA is not rejected. This has important 
implications for analyzing the impacts of CAIS on crop production.    
 
 
5.0 SIMULATION OF PROGRAM IMPACTS FOR MANITOBA  
 
5.1 Introduction  
      
Program impacts on output are simulated from estimates of the econometric models 
above. These models estimate impacts of expected prices, price variances, wealth and 
insurance effects on investment and output. Here we calculate effects of programs on 






processes apply to these program effects as in the aggregate. Then we combine these 
assumed program impacts on variables with econometric results in order to simulate 
program impacts on output.  Crops 1, 2, 3 are wheat barley and canola respectively. 
 
5.2 Parameter Assumptions 
      
Long run and short run impacts on yields are estimated from ADL yield equations. 
However an ADL model is a reduced form dynamic model that does not identify separate 
lags in response from lags in expectations. This can be a serious problem in estimating 
response along a dynamic path, but it does not seem so serious in estimating long run 
response, where it is not so important to identify the source of lags. In inferring short-run 
responses from our estimates, we assume that lags in expectations follow our simple naive 
model, so that short run lags in response are identified.  
    
First consider wheat yields. The relevant long-run elasticities (sum of lag 
coefficients) from Table A- 5 columns A and B in Appendix A are as follows:    
 
Table 1                      Long Run Elasticity of Wheat Yield 
  Table  A-5 Column A Table  A-5 Column B
Expected Output Price (Ep1)          +0.5306 +0.3834
Variance of Output Price (Vp1)     -0.0451 -0.0426
Initial Wealth (W0)                        +0.4322 +0.2626
 
 
We will use estimates from Table A- 5 Column A (OLS, excluding the insignificant lagged 
dependent variable). The short run (current period) elasticities are: 
 
Table 2   Short Run Elasticity of Wheat Yield 
  Table  A-5 Column A Table  A-5 Column B
Expected Output Price (Ep1)          +0.1768       +0.1278
Variance of Output Price (Vp1)     -0.0407        -0.0434
Initial Wealth (W0)                        +0.2923       +0.1730
Insurance Effect (CovGp1)             -0.0309         -0.0304 
 
For barley yields, the relevant long-run elasticities from Table A- 7columns A and B 
Appendix A:  
 
Table 3            Long Run Elasticity of Barley Yield 
  Table  A-7 Column A Table  A-7 Column B
Expected Output Price (Ep2)          +0.5310 +0.5202
Variance of Output Price (Vp2)     -0.1363         -0.1451
Initial Wealth (W0)                        0.4395         +0.4105







We will use estimates from Table 7A (OLS, excluding the insignificant lagged dependent 
variable). The short run (current period) elasticities are:   
 
Table 4    Short Run Elasticity of Barley Yield 
  Table  A-7 Column A Table  A-7 Column B
Expected Output Price (Ep2)          +0.1768       +0.1029
Variance of Output Price (Vp2)     -0.0407       -0.0473
Initial Wealth (W0)                        +0.2923      +0.2534
Insurance Effect (CovGp2)             0  0 
 
For canola yields, the relevant long run elasticities from Table 8AB in the Appendix 
are (initial wealth is statistically insignificant):  
 
Table 5  Long Run Elasticity of Canola Yield 
  Table  A-8 Column A Table  A-8 Column B
Expected Output Price (Ep3)          +0.3203       +0.3143
Variance of Output Price (Vp3)     -0.0520        -0.0541
Initial Wealth (W0)                        0 0 
Insurance Effect (CovGp3)             0  0 
 
We will use estimates from Table 8A (OLS, excluding the insignificant lagged dependent 
variable). 
The short run (current period) elasticities are all zero.  
     
Crop acreage demands are specified as static models providing only a current 
period (short run) response conditional on yields rather than a dynamic response. 
Coefficient estimates are from the following Tables in the Appendix B on crop acreage 
demands: Table B-1 column A for wheat, Table B-2 column B for barley, and Table B-3 
column A for canola. Elasticities are calculated based on average shares over 1960-2002 











  Wheat Acres Share  Barley Acres Share Canola Acres Share
  Coef  elasticity Coef elasticity Coef  elasticity
Er1  +0.1051  +0.2257 -0.0542 -0.3092 0 0 
Er2  +0.0866  +0.1860 +0.1246 +0.7108 -0.1339  -1.1347
Er3  -0.0702  -0.1508 -0.0236 -0.1346 +0.0993  +0.8415
Vr1  -0.0156  -0.0335 0 0 0  0
Vr2  0  0  0 0 -0.0115  -0.0975
Vr3  0  0  0 0 -.0052  -.0441
Vr12  +0.00005  +0.0001 0 0 0  0
Vr24  0  0  -0.0072 -0.0411 0  0
W0  -0.1577  -0.3388 0 0 0  0
VW2  +.0156 +.0335 0 0 -0.0056  -0.0475
 
 
In the long run, changes in acreage demands also depend on long run changes in 
yields. For example, a LR elasticity of +0.53  for Ep1 on wheat yield implies that a 1% 
increase in Ep1 induces a 1.53% increase in Er1 in the LR, so the LR elasticities of  acreage 
demands with respect to Ep1 are 1.53 times larger than  the impacts of Er1 reported in the 
previous table. The change in wheat yield also induces a change in revenue uncertainty per 
acre Vr1 and Vr1i, but these effects on acreage demands are minor  (given small elasticities 
of demand with respect to Vr) and are  ignored here. Similarly a LR elasticity of -0.045 for 
Vp1 on wheat yield implies that a 1% increase in Vp1 induces a 0.045% decrease in Er1 in 
the LR, and this is incorporated into LR impacts of Vp1 on demands. This impact on wheat 
yield also induces a change in LR Vr1 and Vr1i, but these effects are minor and therefore 
are ignored here (e.g. approximating Vr1 as yld1 
2Vp1, then a 1% increase in Vp1 induces a 
0.998% LR increase in Vr1). Since initial wealth W0 induces statistically significant long run 
changes in both wheat and barley yields, these effects multiplied by effects of Er on 
acreage are incorporated into long run impacts of W0 on acreage. LR impacts on acreage 







Table 7   Elasticities of Acreage Demands in Short and Long Run 
  Wheat Acres Share  Barley Acres Share Canola Acres Share
  SR  LR  SR LR SR  LR
Ep1  +0.2257  +.3455         -0.3092 -.4733          0  0 
Ep2  +0.1860  +.2848         +0.7108 +1.0882         -1.1347  -1.7372
Ep3  -0.1508  -.1991          -0.1346 -.1777          +0.8415  +1.1110
Vp1  -0.0335  -.0437          0 +.0139          0  0 
Vp2  0  -.0254          0 -.1253          -0.0975  +.0572
Vp3  0  +.0078         0 +.0070          -.0441  -.0879
Vp12  +0.0001  +.0001         0 0 0  0
Vp24  0  0  -0.0411 -0.0411 0  0
W0  -0.3388  -.1595          0 +.1788          0  -.0588
VW2  +.0335 +.0335 0 0 -0.0475  -0.0475
 
These estimates for yield and acreage response can be combined into long run and 
short run impacts on output (conditional on total crop acres). Long run impacts on output 
are   the sum of long run impacts on yields plus long run impacts on acres. Short run 
impacts on output are the sum of short run impacts on yields plus short run impacts on 
acres.                          
 
Table 8   Output Elasticities Short and Long Run 
  Wheat Output  Barley Output Canola Output
  SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Ep1  +.4025        +.8761         -.3092          -.4733          0  0 
Ep2  +.1860          +.2848        +.8876          +1.6192         -1.1347  -1.7372 
Ep3  -.1508          -.1991          -.1346          -.1777          +.8415  +1.4303 
Vp1  -.0742  -.0888          0              +.0139          0  0 
Vp2  0  -.0254          -.0407          -.2616          -.0975  +.0572 
Vp3  0  +.0078         0              +.0070          0  -.1399 
Vp12  +.0001          +.0001         0              0  0  0 
Vp24  0  0  -.0411          -.0411          0  0 
W0  -.0405          +.2727         +.2923          +.6183          0  -.0588 
CovGp  -.0309  -.0503  0 0 0 0 
VW2  +.0335          +.0335         0  0  -.0475  -.0475 
 
5.3 GRIP 
      
Here we briefly consider one relatively standard program that can serve as a 
benchmark for the current program. The Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) was 
introduced in 1989 and provided payments to Manitoba crop producers from 1991 to 1995. 
 GRIP was the major source of government payments to Manitoba crop producers over this 
period. The program was intended to stabilize partially gross income from crops. In 
Manitoba and all provinces except Saskatchewan, revenue insurance was crop specific. A 
farmer would pay a premium to insure gross revenues of a crop at a certain level, and he 






were subsidized (typically producers would pay 1/3 of the insurance premium).  Target 
revenue depended on long-run yields and a 15 year moving average price. The crop 
specific nature of the insurance program presumably encouraged a shift in production from 
low risk crops to high risk crops.  
      
Annual GRIP data was obtained for 1991-1995 from the Farm Financial Branch of 
AAFC. Data relevant to our simulation of GRIP is summarized as follows.  
 
 Table 9  Percentage Change in Output Price due to GRIP 
 wheat  barley  canola  oats  rye  flax  total 
1991  0.419 0.183 0.057 0.034 0.360 0.469 0.276 
1992  0.129 0.037 0.029 0.003 0.116 0.105 0.079 
1993  0.411 0.134 0.058 0.013 0.097 0.211 0.241 
1994  0.034 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.021 0.029 0.024 
1995  -0.009  -0.002 0.000  -0.001 0.001 0.013  -0.005 
avg.  0.197 0.074 0.034 0.011 0.119 0.165 0.123 
 
These figures are the percentage change in farm level crop output prices due to GRIP 
(indemnities minus farmer premiums) relative to market prices. Total is an index of these 
changes for all 6 crops.  
      
Correlations of total indemnities with total crop market revenue, a Divisia index of 
market prices for the 6 crops, and market price for wheat over 1991-1995 are presented in 
the following table. Similar correlations are presented for total indemnities minus farmer 
premiums. 
  
Table 10  Correlations of total indemnities (1991-1995) 
  Total Indemnities  Total Net Indemnities 
Total Revenue  -0.9492  -0.9595 
Divisia Price  -0.9005  -0.8846 
Wheat Price  -0.8813  -0.8728 
 
Thus GRIP payments were very highly negatively correlated with Manitoba market 
revenues and prices.  
 
Our econometric models can be used to simulate impacts of these price supports 
and insurance effects on output. We consider impacts for average levels of percentage 
increase in price and for 1991, when this increase was highest. This data is taken from 
table 8 with respect to price changes. Impacts of price changes are calculated using 






source of insurance effects for Manitoba crop producers over this period, the insurance 
impact of GRIP (or of removing GRIP) is approximated by coefficients of insurance effect in 
the previous section. The insurance effect indicates the impact of GRIP in truncating 
uncertainty (so we do not also calculate impacts of GRIP through changes in the price 
variance Vp term of econometric models).  GRIP does not have a direct impact on wealth, 
although of course it may lead to future accumulation of wealth. Nevertheless we ignore 
this indirect effect of GRIP, or we assume that it is implicit in our econometric models.  
      
The calculated short-run (one year) and long-run impacts of GRIP on crop outputs 
are summarized in the following tables.  
 








Average short  run  0.0879  0.0309  0.1188 
 long  run  0.1868  0.0503  0.2371 
1991 short  run  0.1943  0.0309  0.2252 
 long  run  0.4083  0.0503  0.4586 
 








Average short  run  0.0006  0  0.0006 
 long  run  0.0213  0  0.0213 
1991 short  run  0.0255  0  0.0255 
 long  run  0.0885  0  0.0885 
 








Average short  run  -0.0558  0 -0.0558 
 long  run -0.0486  0  -0.0486 
1991 short  run  -0.1602  0  -0.1602 




6.1 Introduction  
      
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) Program was approved in 
late 2003 and is now Canada's single safety net program, in place of the Net Income 
Stabilization Account (NISA), Canadian Farm Income Plan (CFIP) and related provincial 
programs. The program structure can be summarized briefly as follows. A production 






for the firm. A reference production margin is an average of the five previous production 
margins for the firm, excluding the high and low margins. If the production margin for the 
firm is less than the reference margin for the year, then claims generally are triggered for 
the difference. Claim payments are financed from producer deposits and government 
contributions, and shares vary with the difference relative to the reference margin as 
follows:  producer deposits cover 1/2 of 0 to 15% loss, 3/10 of 15 to 30% loss, and 1/5 of 
loss greater than 30 % (claims are in principle limited by available producer deposits, which 
must be a minimum   of 14 % of the current reference production margin). The government 
finances 60% of negative production margins. By supporting incomes during low income 
years, CAIS may influence production decisions.  
      
CAIS payouts are based on farm specific losses relative to reference margin rather 
than on a regional measure of loss (as in the Western Grain Stabilization Act). Current 
payouts to a farm depend on the difference between (farm) reference margin and current 
profits for the particular farm. Presumably this creates moral hazard problems. From the 
viewpoint of the current paper, this also substantially changes shadow prices for outputs 
and inputs, and so in theory this has a substantial impact on production.  
      
Most analytical studies of farm program impacts under risk focus on analyzing a 
formal specification of an expected utility (or mean variance) maximization problem with 
integral versions of truncated distributions for price or yield. Much has been accomplished 
in this way (e.g. Chavas and Holt; Hennessy).  However relations between shadow prices 
and risk under various insurance type programs have often been obscured (two exceptions 
in the context of crop insurance are Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton; Ramaswami).  
      
In contrast, this study focuses directly on moments of distributions of net returns 
under programs. Simple statistics, essentially only expectations operators, are adequate for 
our purposes. This approach clarifies CAIS program impacts on shadow   prices under risk. 
Calculated changes in moments translate into production impacts using homogeneity 
conditions under constant relative risk aversion and estimates of an econometric model.  
      
We adopt the following notation. For a firm in a particular  year t, let p denote a 
vector of market prices for commodities i  = 1,.,n, y is a vector of corresponding output 
levels, w is a  vector of market prices for inputs j=1,.,m, and x is a vector  of corresponding 
input levels. Let π = p y - w x denote farm level profits or market income. We will assume 
that this represents production margin, which is a reasonable approximation for our 
purposes. Let π
T denote the reference production margin.  This is the average of the 
production margins over the previous 5  years, deleting the high and low, and denote this 
as π
T = Σs πt-s  /s. Total payouts under CAIS to the farm are π
T - π if π
T > π ≥ 0  (assuming 
adequate producer deposits are available). Let θ denote the government share of total 
payouts in this case (θ = 0 if there is no trigger, i.e. π






initial wealth of the farm. Then end of year wealth for the farm can be defined as:  
 
) 0 - π  (        W   W
Τ
F π θ π + + =           ( 6 )  
Suppose for the moment that all prices and yields are known  with certainty, so that 
π is known for any given production decisions y,x. Assume that, in the absence of CAIS, 
the firm  maximizes profits: max(x,y)εT π = py - wx or equivalently maxy π  = py - C(w,y) 
where C(w,y) is the firm's dual cost function. At the profit maximizing output levels y* the 
corresponding first order conditions are  
 
    =   ∂ = ∂ ∂ 0 C(w,y*)/y p -  y π(y*)/          ( 7 )  
  
In the presence of CAIS, the firm will consider the impact of its decisions y,x on 
government payments as well as farm  profits π. In addition, if the firm expects CAIS to 
continue into the future, it will consider the impact of current decisions on future reference 
margins and in turn on future government payouts. The function θ = θ(π
T,π) is continuous 
in π and is  defined by CAIS rules. Then the firm's maximization decision for year t can be 
represented as follows (assuming for simplicity that current π is neither high nor low π over 
each of the next 5 years):  
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Equation (8) also assumes that current π and future π are independent, i.e. the production 
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At the profit maximizing level y* in the absence of CAIS, ∂π(y*)/∂y = 0. Then y* also 
solves the first order conditions (8) under CAIS. This implies that, in the absence of 
uncertainty, CAIS would not influence production decisions.  
 
The first order conditions (8a) also imply effective or shadow prices for outputs and 
inputs under CAIS. Substituting p -  ∂C(w,y)/∂y for ∂π/∂y in (8), ∂ψ/∂yi = γ pi - γ ∂C(w,y)/∂yi = 







s  +  ∂θ/∂π (π
T - π)  +  Σs=1,.,5  ∂θt+s/∂π  π /3(1+r)
s . Then effective prices under CAIS 
can be defined as 
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Note that Ep* / w* = Ep / w, i.e. relative shadow prices are unchanged by CAIS. So 
decisions are unchanged by CAIS in the absence of uncertainty.  
      
These shadow prices have a simple explanation. Assume an exogenous θ > 0 and 
π
T - π > 0, and ignore impacts on future reference margins. Then an increase in market 
income Δπ leads to a decrease in government payments θ Δπ, i.e. the net effect is (1 - θ) 
Δπ . Thus the net effect on total income (farm income plus government payments) is (1 - θ) 
for a $1 increase in revenue and also (1 - θ) for a $1 decrease in cost. So the shadow 
prices for outputs and inputs are (1 - θ) p and (1 - θ) w.  
 
6.2 Modeling Impacts of CAIS under Price Uncertainty and Risk Aversion  
      
The contribution of current period production decisions to farm wealth under CAIS 
assuming certainty is summarized essentially by the above function ψ (8). If the farmer 
suspects that CAIS will not exist in the future, then current production   margin π does not 
create an investment in future reference margins π
T, and then ψ reduces to  
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We now recognize that output price and in turn π and θ are random variables, but we 
ignore uncertainty in y,w,x (and W0). We assume that producer deposits are sufficient to 
cover loss claims under CAIS, and we do not address any impacts of opportunity costs for 
farmer deposits on production incentives.  
      
Truncation effects of support programs under risk are often analyzed as in Chavas 
and Holt (e.g. von Massow and Weersink).  This approach provides analytical evaluations 
of truncations of price moments for simple price support programs which place a floor 
under market price. However CAIS is a more complex program, so these simple 
evaluations of truncations presumably do not apply here. Nevertheless effects of CAIS (or 
at least our idealized version of CAIS) on price distributions can be analyzed by simple 
statistics plus synthetic data, as we will show.  
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If θ and π are related approximately by a linear model θ = α0 + α1 π + α2 Z + e where Ee=0, 
then Eθ = α0 + α1 Eπ + α2 EZ and in turn ∂Eθ/∂yi = ∂Eθ/∂Eπ ∂Eπ/∂yi. ∂Eθ/∂Eπ = α1 and 
∂Eπ/∂yi = Epi -  ∂C(w,y)/∂yi .  
      
Furthermore it might be tempting to evaluate ∂cov(θ,π)/∂y as  ∂cov(θ,π)/∂π ∂π/∂y 
and approximate ∂π/∂y as Ep - ∂C(w,y)/∂y. In this case (12) would imply that CAIS would 
not change relative expected prices Ep and w. However this argument would be incorrect.  
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Note that the above argument does not make any assumptions regarding the form (e.g. 
linearity) of the relation between θ and π.  
      
The argument can be summarized in words as follows. As perceived by the firm, θ 
and π are random variables. We assume that the cost component wx of π is known to the 
firm, so the  covariance cov(θ,π) of the random variables θ and π (as perceived  by the 
firm) reduces to the covariance cov(θ,R) between θ and revenues R. Assuming for 
simplicity that y is non-stochastic,  cov(θ,R) reduces to Σi cov(θ,pi) yi . In sum, 
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We will need to evaluate cov(θ,pi) or more precisely  ∂cov(θ,R)/∂yi, which requires an 
evaluation of cov(θ,R). Assume  that the firm's subjective probability distribution for θ can 
be  approximated by a linear regression model θ = α0 + α1 R + α2 Z +  e relating current θ to 
current R, where Z denotes other variables conditioning the firm's subjective probability 
distribution for θ, and e is a disturbance. Current θ and current R are uncertain (not known 
with certainty) to the firm and hence both are stochastic in the firm's subjective distribution. 
Z is essentially information known with certainty that conditions the firm's subjective 
distribution for θ (Z is essentially current costs and lagged θ and π). Then Z is non-
stochastic, so stochastic current R will not covary with Z in terms of this subjective 
probability distribution. Then cov(θ,R) is evaluated as follows in terms of the firm's 
subjective probability distribution.  
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Comparing (13a) and (13b), 
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Since all cov(pi ,pj) ≥ 0 for Manitoba and α1 ≤ 0 by CAIS rules,  then cov(θ,pi) ≤ 0. So 
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This is our key result for calculating impacts of CAIS on relative expected prices Ep/w and 
Epi/Epj . Note that α1 can be calculated from (13b) as 
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The subjective cov(θ,π) (π
T  known with certainty) may be better calculated from data as  
cov(θ,π-π
T), which can be decomposed in data to cov(θ,π) -  cov(θ,π
T) . Thus it is not 
necessary to estimate α1 by econometrics. Indeed regression is inappropriate since the 
covariance of the joint subjective distribution for θ and π reflects a nonlinear identity 
corresponding to CAIS rules. Also an appropriate regression model may have nonlinear 
errors in variables.  
      
One difficulty with the above analysis (13 b)-(17) is the  assumption of a linear 
relation between θ and π or π-π
T, whereas  CAIS rules define a nonlinear relation. In order 
to see the complications implied by nonlinearity, consider a quadratic relation θ = α0 + α1 π 
+ α2 π
2. Then wx non-stochastic implies cov(θ,π) = α1 var(R) + α2 cov(R
2,R), so α1 and α2 
cannot both be  calculated from this equation. However we will conclude in the next section 
that the linear approximation appears to be adequate for a particular Manitoba data set.  
      
Note that, since Epi is non-stochastic, cov(θ,pi)  ≡ E{(θ-Eθ)(pi-Epi)} = Epi 
E{(θ-Eθ)(pi/Epi-1)}  ≠ Epi E{(θ-Eθ)(pi-1)} unless Epi=1 . Thus cov(θ,pi) is not directly 
proportional to Epi (although scaling the random variable pi by λ multiplies Epi and  cov(θ,pi) 
by λ). So relative expected output prices Epi / Epj are changed (to at least some extent) by 
CAIS.  
      
Under our assumptions, (16) implies that (12) can be approximated as 
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Thus the increase in Eψ' for a marginal increase in yi, excluding the marginal cost ∂C/∂yi, is 
τ Epi - 2 cov(θ,pi). In turn shadow expected returns for a marginal increase in yi are τ Epi - 2 
cov(θ,pi). Also note that τ·∂C(w,y)/∂yi = ∂C(τw,y)/∂yi since the cost function is linear   
homogeneous in prices. Thus our assumptions imply that effective expected prices and 
effective expected initial wealth under CAIS are approximately 
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The difference between effective expected output and input prices under CAIS and 
expected market prices can be explained somewhat intuitively as follows. First, an increase 
in output and hence income leads to a decrease in government payments both directly 
(through a change in π) and indirectly (through an induced change in θ). This tends to 
reduce uniformly shadow prices of outputs and inputs as indicated by the terms τ Epi and τ 
wj, τ = (1-Eθ) + ∂Eθ/∂Eπ (π
T-Eπ). These effects by themselves do not change relative 
prices.   
      
Second, consider the covariance effect. Costs are assumed to be non-stochastic, so 
the covariance between θ and income reduces to a covariance between θ and market 
revenue  py. Since this covariance is independent of costs, it does not imply a 
transformation of input prices. This covariance does imply a transformation of output prices.  
      
The expected value of investment in future CAIS payouts can be approximated as 
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Here the covariance between government share of payouts in the  future (θt+s) and current 
profits π is positive (an increase in  current production margin leads to an increase in future 
reference margin without influencing future production margins,  so θ is likely to increase in 
the future). So cov(θt+s,π) > 0. We will simplify (20) to  
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The marginal impact of y on (21) is approximated as: 
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Assuming that farmers expect CAIS to continue into the future and  factor investment in 
future CAIS payouts into their decisions, then the effective expected prices under CAIS are 
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Next consider how CAIS modifies income uncertainty. The variance of ψ' (8) is: 
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     ( 2 4 ) 
If the firm could predict θ with certainty, then (24) would imply Var ψ' = (1-Eθ)
2 Var π, i.e. 
the variance measure of uncertainty under  CAIS would be less than the variance of market 
income. In principle, an effective price covariance matrix Vp* under CAIS can be obtained 
by twice differentiating (24) with respect to y. 
 
Alternatively, we can define two components of the effective variance of ψ' (24) as 
follows: 
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(these include 7 of the 8 terms in the last expression for (24)).  Note that (25a) are not 
necessarily less than market price uncertainty Vp, due to uncertainty about θ. However it 
seems very unlikely that CAIS will increase the variance measures of price uncertainty. Vp* 
and ∅ can be substituted into the estimated econometric model in place of market price 
uncertainty  Vp and covariance between government payments and market prices   
cov(G,p), respectively.  
      
If farmers factor investment in future CAIS payouts into their decision making, then 
the measure of uncertainty under CAIS is more complex. The variance of investment in 
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The covariance between ψ' and value of investment is approximated as: 
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Then (26) and twice (27) should be added to the variance expression (24). In principle the 
effective price covariance matrix can be derived from second derivatives with respect to y 
of this altered variance expression. Alternatively, investment in future CAIS payments alters 
the components (25) of the effective price covariance matrix to approximately 
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6.3 Estimation of CAIS Specific Parameters of Response  
 
Time series data on Manitoba level farm incomes over 1960- 2002 are used to 
construct a hypothetical time series of government shares of payouts under CAIS, by 
combining this data with CAIS rules for payouts. Production margin is approximated as crop 
and livestock market receipts minus operating expenses after rebates and minus 
depreciation charges, per farm (Manitoba Agriculture Yearbook 2002, pp. 209-210). 
Reference margin is the average of the five previous production margins, excluding high 
and low. Percentage loss measures a negative difference between production and 
reference margin, relative to (absolute value) of reference margin. Government payouts for 
a year is calculated  under the following assumptions: government share of payouts for  a 
negative margin is 0.60, and government share of payouts from 0   margin to a (positive) 
reference margin is decomposed as 0.50 for  0-15 % loss, 0.70 for 15-30 % loss, and 0.80 
above 30 % loss  relative to reference margin. An average government share of total 
payouts θ is calculated for each year.  
      
Results for this exercise are summarized in Table 1 of Appendix C. Margins are 
measured in $ per farm. The time series mean and variance for these estimates of θ 






correlation between θ and production margin π is -0.6299, and the correlation between θ 
and market revenue per farm R is -0.1418.  
      
Alternatively Eθ (expected government share of payouts) can be approximated as 
follows. If income for a representative farm does not show significant upward trend over 
time, then CAIS rules imply payouts in approximately half the years. In the Manitoba data 
set under CAIS rules, payouts would have occurred in 24 of 37 years, so this result is 
higher than expected. The lowest government share of payouts is 50% (for losses less than 
15% relative to reference margin). So 0 payout and 50% payout average to a 25% 
expected payout, i.e. Eθ = 0.25. So we have two scenarios for Eθ: (A) Eθ = 0.3907 from 
Manitoba data, and (B) Eθ = 0.25.  
      
In order to assess the magnitude of cov(θ,p) or more  precisely ∂cov(θ,π)/∂yi relative 
to p for this data set, we  consider two approaches. First, note that (12') cov(θ,R) = Σi  
cov(θ,pi) yi assuming only output prices are stochastic, and   market revenues are R ≡ Σi pi 
yi . For the data set, cov(θ,R) =  -1833.0 and average R = 61539, so cov(θ,R) is 2.98% of 
average  R. Since all cov(θ,pi) ≤ 0, magnitudes of cov(θ,p) may roughly  approximate 3% of 
p. By (16) and (19), the CAIS effects ∂cov(θ,π)/∂y imply an approximate 6% increase in 
effective output prices p relative to input prices w.  
      
Second, consider the earlier discussion (13)-(16). Assume that current θ is related to 
current R by a linear regression model θ = α0 + α1 R + α2 Z + e where Z denotes other 
variables (essentially current reference margin and costs, lagged θ and R) explaining the 
firm's subjective probability distribution for θ.  Then (13b) cov(θ,π) = α1 y
T Vp y assuming y 
is non-stochastic. This permits calculation of α1 as α1 = cov(θ,π) / y
T Vp y. The price 
covariance matrix Vp is measured over 1966-2002 Manitoba market price data for the six 
main crops and livestock and hogs, and y is defined as the average outputs of these 
commodities over the period. Then y
T Vp y = .24591 X 10
9. For the data set, cov(θ,π) =  
-1153.3 and cov(θ,π-π
T) = -1300.1. The latter may be a more appropriate measure of 
cov(θ,π) for the subjective distribution conditional on knowledge of reference margin π
T, but 
the difference is relatively minor. Using the latter, α1 is calculated as α1 = -0.5287x 10
-5.  
      
By (15) and (16), cov(θ,pi) = α1 Σj cov(pi,pj) yj and  ∂cov(θ,π)/∂yi = 2 cov(θ,pi) . The 
following table reports the estimated cov(θ,pi) for the six major crops and also for cattle  
and hogs (units are $/tonne for crops and $/animal for cattle and   hogs). The table also 
reports the percentage change in output prices related to ∂cov(θ,π)/∂yi, i.e. -2cov(θ,pi)/pi . 
All calculations are based on average Manitoba data over 1966-2002. 






Table 14  Covariance of share of government payments and price 
 cov(θ,pi) -2cov(θ,pi)/pi 
Wheat -3.35  0.0528 
Barley -2.53  0.0548 
Canola -6.82  0.0533 
Oats -2.7  0.0542 
Flax -2.51  0.0561 
Rye -6.21  0.0502 
Cattle -17.31  0.0607 
Hogs -2.15  0.0425 
 
These calculations suggest that CAIS would increase price ratios Ep/w by 5-6% for all 
crops. This would tend to increase yields. On the other hand, the output price ratios Epi/Epj 
for different crops are essentially unchanged by CAIS, so CAIS would have no direct impact 
on crop acreage shares through changes in relative output prices.  
      
The essentially unchanged output price ratios pi/pj under CAIS reflect the similar 
terms Σj cov(pi,pj) yj / pi for all crops and livestock in this data set. These terms can be 
expressed as E[φ(pi-Epi)]/pi where φ ≡ Σj (pj-Epj) yj .  Apparently this similarity reflects the 
particular historical conditions in Manitoba over 1966-2002, i.e. these terms need not be so 
similar.    
      
Note that the results in this table are similar to the 6% estimate of change in Ep/w 
obtained by the first method, although the two methods use somewhat different 
assumptions. The first method approximated cov(θ,pi) without assuming a linear relation  
between θ and π, whereas the second method estimated cov(θ,pi) assuming a linear 
relation between θ and π (or π-π
T). CAIS rules imply a nonlinear relation between θ and 
π-π
T (and θ was calculated accordingly in this data set), but the similarity of results for the 
two methods suggest that the linear approximation in the second method has been 
acceptable for our purposes.  
      
Assuming a linear approximation as above between θ and π, then ∂Eθ/∂Eπ can be 
approximated as α1 = -0.5287 X 10
-5. This provides an estimate of ∂Eθ/∂Eπ in τ for the 
shadow price equations (19). Then under scenario A (Eθ = 0.3907), τ = (1-Eθ) + ∂Eθ/∂Eπ 
(π
T-Eπ) can be approximated as τ = 0.6093 - 0.000005287 (π
T-Eπ). τ = 0.6136 using mean 
data for π
T-π = -827 over the data set. Under scenario B (Eθ = .25), τ = 0.75 - 0.000005287 
(π
T-Eπ) = 0.7543 using mean data for π
T-π.  
     The impact of CAIS on effective expected prices and expected wealth can then be 
approximated as follows under the two  scenarios (A) Eθ = 0.3907 from Manitoba data, and 
(B) Eθ = 0.25. 
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Where the covariances cov(θ,pi) are indicated in table 12. 
 
The components (25) of the effective variance of ψ' are calculated as follows. 
Cov(θ,π) is approximated as -1153 from the  data set (correlation is -0.6299). Similarly 
cov((1-θ)
2,π
2) and  Cov(θπ,θ) are measured from the data set as 16261000 and 0.82088,  
respectively (correlations are .3913 and .0013). Then (25) are measured as: 
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Thus effective price uncertainty Vp* under CAIS are substantially less than market Vp, as 
approximated here. ∅ = -4173712.5 at average data over the data set. The remaining term 
in varψ' (24) is {Eπ
2 + (π
T)
2} Varθ = 1478272.3 at average data, which is  smaller in 
magnitude than the estimate of ∅. Vp* and ∅ might be  substituted into the estimated 
econometric model in place of  market price uncertainty Vp and covariance between 
government  payments and market prices cov(G,p), respectively.  
 
6.4 Hypothetical Impacts of CAIS on Prices, Wealth and Price Risk  
 
Short run and long run crop production impacts of CAIS are simulated from our 
Manitoba data set and econometric estimates of acreage and yield response for Manitoba. 
Simulations are   conducted using average time series data for Manitoba over 1966- 2002 
and also using 2002 data.  






Calculation of impacts of CAIS on effective relative expected prices Ep/w is simple, 
given above results. From (20) and an above table of estimates for changes in p, 
percentage  changes in effective relative expected prices Ep/w due to CAIS  are (under 
scenarios (A) Eθ = 0.3907 and (B) Eθ = 0.75)  
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Thus CAIS would lead to an approximately 8 to 9% increase in effective relative expected 
prices Epi/w for all crops under scenario (A) Eθ = 0.3907, or to an approximately 7% 
increase under scenario (B) Eθ = 0.25.  
      
However further calculations of impact on relative wealth and price uncertainty is not 
straightforward. A brief summary of homogeneity conditions and appropriate normalizations 
under alternative risk preferences is required in order to clarify these calculations. A reason 
for confusion in normalization is that CAIS changes all expected effective prices, i.e. CAIS 
changes shadow prices for inputs as well as for outputs.  
      
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is a benchmark assumption in the theory of 
decision making under risk. Moreover the CRRA hypothesis was tested and not rejected for 
the above Manitoba acreage demands model. It is difficult to test the expected utility (or 
mean variance) hypothesis within our framework.  
      
Assuming CRRA and mean-variance or expected utility  maximizing behaviour, the 
zero homogeneity condition on output  supplies is y(λEp,λw,λ
2Vp,λW0) = y(Ep,w,Vp,W0) for 
any λ>0 (Pope  1988; Coyle 1999), and here we select λ = 1/wi for normalization, i.e. the 
crop index input price index is the numeraire price. Any vectors (Ep, w, Vp, W0) that are 
proportional as in the homogeneity condition lead to the same decision y, and it is variation 
in these proportions that leads to changes in decisions. Similarly  under CAIS and CRRA 
the identical homogeneity condition is  y(λEp*,λw*,λ
2Vp*,λW0*) = y(Ep*,w*,Vp*,W0*) for any 
λ>0, and we  can select either λ = 1/wi or λ = 1/wi*. In comparing market and  CAIS 






and λ = 1/wi* (or any other  expected price under CAIS) to normalize CAIS variables  
(Ep*,w*,Vp*,W0*).  
      
On the other hand, consider the more restrictive assumption of constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA). Under expected utility  maximizing behavior and CARA, the zero 
homogeneity condition on output supplies is y(λEp,λw,λVp) = y(Ep,w,Vp) for any λ>0 (Coyle 
 1992), and again we select λ = 1/wi (initial wealth does not  influence decisions under 
CARA). Here Vp is normalized by wi rather than by wi
2 as under CRRA. The same 
homogeneity condition  under CAIS is y(λEp*,λw*,λVp*) = y(Ep*,w*,Vp*) for any λ>0, and  
we can select λ = 1/wi* . Note that, in more general models of risk preferences than CRRA 
or CARA, there generally does not exist any appropriate homogeneity condition or 
normalization for Ep,w,Vp,W0 or counterparts under CAIS (Chavas and Pope). 
      
The main impact of CAIS on effective (Ep, w, Vp, W0) is an approximately equi-
proportional decrease in effective Ep,w  (essentially because an increase in profits implies 
a reduction  in government payouts) and a small increase in nominal wealth.  This implies 
in effect a substantial increase in relative wealth.  For example, under the homogeneity 
condition for CRRA and utility  maximization, a 40 percent decrease in Ep,w (and decrease 
in Vp to .6
2 of initial levels) and a constant W0 would imply the same decisions as 0 change 
in Ep,w (and Vp) and a 67 percent increase  in W0: y(.6Ep,.6w,.6
2Vp,W0) = y(Ep,w,Vp,1/.6 
W0) (λ=1/.6). Thus, in effect, CAIS has a substantial impact on relative wealth through 
substantial reductions in effective prices Ep,w.  
      
Changes in relative wealth W0/w due to changes in effective input prices w are 
calculated as follows. Under scenario (A) Eθ =  0.3907, effective input prices decrease by 
39%, so normalized wealth increases by 63%. Under scenario (B) Eθ = 0.25, effective   
input prices decrease by 25%, so normalized wealth increases by 33%.  
      
The impact of CAIS on relative price variances depends on the form of risk aversion, 
as can be seen from the different homogeneity conditions under CRRA and CARA. 
Assuming CRRA, our normalization Ep/wi  (and  w/wi) of expected prices implies the 
following normalization of price variances and covariances: Vp /  (wi)
2 where Vp are market 
price variances and covariances.  Similarly our normalization Ep*/wi* under CAIS implies 
Vp* /  (wi*)
2. Under scenario (A) Eθ = 0.3907, Vp* = .459 Vp and w* = 0.6136 w using (25), 
(29) and mean data for the data set. Under scenario (B) Eθ = 0.25, Vp* = .651 Vp and w* = 
.7543 w. Then under CRRA the percentage change in relative price uncertainty due to 
CAIS is: 
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i.e. CAIS leads to a 22 or 14% increase in relative price uncertainty, assuming CRRA.  
      
This result may seem counterintuitive, but it follows from the 
homogeneity/normalization condition under CRRA and utility maximization. In nominal 
terms Vp* = .459 Vp (under A), which represents a reduction in uncertainty under CAIS. 
However CAIS also reduces effective w (w* = .6136 w). Under the CRRA normalization 
Vp/w
2 and Vp*/(w*)
2 and the Manitoba data set, the  net effect of CAIS is an increase in 
relative uncertainty Vp.    
      
On the other hand, consider the more restrictive assumption of CARA. In this case, 
an appropriate normalization for price variances and covariances is Vp/w and similarly 
Vp*/w*. Then under CARA the percentage change in relative price uncertainty due to CAIS 
is 
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i.e. CAIS leads to a 25 or 14 % decrease in relative price  uncertainty, as defined here 
assuming CARA. 
 
The change in expected wealth due to CAIS can be evaluated as follows. An 
appropriate normalization for initial wealth W0 (corresponding to our previous 
normalizations) is W0/wi under CRRA, and similarly expected wealth EW0 * = W0 + 0.391 π
T 
can be normalized as EW0 * / wi*, where wi* = .6136 wi at average τ.  Then the percentage 
change in relative wealth due to CAIS is 
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as defined here. Note that the difference in w* and w (w* = 0.6136 w or 0.75 w)) implies a 
substantial increase in normalized expected wealth, given this normalization. Here w* < w 
implies an increase in normalized expected wealth under CAIS irrespective of π
T, as 
indicated by the substantial term +0.6297 or +0.3257   above. This is much larger than the 
effect of π






impact on production decisions assuming CRRA. On the other hand, under CARA 
decisions are independent of initial wealth irrespective of normalization, so there is no 
impact on decisions under CARA.  
      
Above we specified expected wealth under CAIS as EW0 * = W0 + Eθ π
T. Denote 
this as scenario I. This scenario assumes that the producer perceives only current year 
government payments as adding to his stock of wealth. This may be a reasonable 
assumption if CAIS is uncertain to continue.  
      
Consider an opposite scenario II where the producer perceives an infinite flow of 
possible CAIS payouts as adding to his stock of wealth. Approximate the present expected 
value of CAIS benefits as Eθ π
T / r, where r is an inter-temporal discount rate. Assuming r = 
0.10, the above formula is modified as 
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The mean reference margin calculated over the data set is π
T = $2,455.7 and the 
2002 level is $6,722.5. This is close to the maximum reference margin calculated for the 
data set ($7,325 for 1979). The mean initial wealth W0 over the data set is $95,816.0 per 
farm, and the 2002 level is $190,188.6. Reference margins are 0.0256 and 0.0353 of initial 
wealth for average data and 2002, respectively. Then the percentage changes in 
normalized expected wealth under scenario I are 0.6457 (A) and 0.3342 (B) for average 
data and 0.6522 (A) and 0.3373 (B) for 2002.  
     
 ∅ is calculated using mean data as above, and ∅/wi*
2 is  calculated using 2000 
level of crop input price index w. ∅/wi*
2  is then divided by the 2000 normalizations for 
cov(G,pi) used in  econometric models. The resulting normalized level of ∅/wi*
2 is 6.090 for 
use in wheat equations. The covariance between historical government payments and 
market prices, cov(G,pi) was  statistically significant for wheat but not other crops in  
econometric models. The short and long run elasticities for wheat output with respect to 
cov(G,pi) were estimated as -0.0309 and  -0.0503. Combining these elasticities with the 
normalized level of ∅, this insurance effect of CAIS on short run and long run wheat output 
is calculated as +0.1882 and +0.3063, respectively.  However it is unclear whether this 
complex measure ∅ of truncated uncertainty under CAIS is comparable to the historical 
measure cov(G,pi) used in the econometric models. If ∅ is not adequately comparable to 
historical cov(Gpi), then we cannot  adequately measure insurance effects of CAIS from 








6.5 Hypothetical Simulation Results for CAIS in Manitoba  
      
Long run and short run impacts of CAIS on crop production are now estimated from 
the earlier tables on long run and short run output elasticities and the above calculations. 
This assumes that CAIS can be simulated adequately by plugging calculated impacts of 
CAIS on relative expected prices, price uncertainty and wealth into the econometric model 
based on historical data.  This may be reasonable in the case of a transparent program 
such as GRIP.  
      
However the impacts of CAIS, as modelled here using economic  theory of decision 
making under risk, presumably are far from  transparent for a typical firm (and perhaps for a 
typical  economist). If CAIS would remain in place for many years then perhaps firm 
behaviour would come to approximate the economic model, but this is unlikely to happen. 
Nevertheless there does not appear to be an alternative dynamic approach based on 
econometrics, since there is insufficient data to estimate a CAIS specific time series model.  
      
We omit CAIS insurance related effects since these do not seem comparable to the 
historical situation. Effects related to investment in future reference margins are also 
omitted, since firms presumably view CAIS as transitory. Including these effects would 
presumably increase the simulated impacts of CAIS on production.  
      
In the above discussion of impacts of CAIS on variables (Ep,w,Vp,W0), we 
emphasized impacts of CAIS on (in effect) the  normalization (Ep/wi,w/wi,Vp/(wi)
2,W/wi) 
consistent with CRRA and  utility maximization. The econometric models were also 
specified and estimated imposing this normalization. So there is no contradiction in 
applying the theoretical analysis to the estimated econometric model.    
      
We first consider impacts of CAIS based on estimates of the crop acreage allocation 
model conditional on yields. The econometric model specified acreage share equations for 
wheat, barley, canola and a fourth aggregate crop (primarily oats, also flax and rye), so 
share equations were estimated for the first  three crops. Market price covariances Vp were 
calculated for the 1966-2002 Manitoba data. Using this Vp and average output price and 
quantity data over the period, CAIS would happen to have essentially zero effect on relative 
output prices pi/pj . In this case CAIS would not have a relative price effect on acreage 






      
The impact of CAIS on price uncertainty varies here with normalization appropriate 
under CRRA (Vp/w
2) and CARA (Vp/w).  Results also vary with the scenario for expected 
government share of payments: (A) Eθ = .3907 using Manitoba data and (B) Eθ = .25.  
Given these different normalizations, relative price uncertainty is calculated to decrease by 
25% (A) or 14% (B) under CARA but to increase by 22% (A) or 14% (B) under CRRA. 
CRRA is considered a less restrictive assumption than CARA, and the CRRA hypothesis 
was not rejected for the acreage demand model. Due to relatively small elasticities of 
response to uncertainty for wheat and barley (-0.0334, -0.0411), this difference between 
CRRA and CARA scenarios has little impact on acreage shares. However, estimated 
elasticities are larger for canola (a sum of -.1416), so these two scenarios have a larger 
impact on canola acres. 
  
Under CRRA, the appropriate normalization for wealth (corresponding to the above 
normalizations) is W0/w and (essentially) W0*/w*. Although CAIS has a relatively small   
impact on nominal wealth W0, it leads to a large reduction in shadow prices for inputs. This 
implies a surprisingly large increase in relative wealth: 64.6% (Eθ = 0.3907) or 33.4% (Eθ = 
0.25). Initial wealth does not influence decisions under CARA. In the econometric model 
under CRRA, the estimated elasticity of wheat acres share with respect to wealth is -0.3388 
(scenario A), and wealth is statistically insignificant in equations for barley and canola. This 
estimated elasticity for wheat seems high, so we also consider an alternative elasticity -.15 
(scenario B).  
 
Simulations of hypothetical impacts of CAIS on wheat, barley and canola acreage 
demands (conditional on yields and total crop acres) under average Manitoba data over 
1966-2002 are presented in the following table. Here scenario A is Eθ = 0.3907 and 
econometric estimates of wealth effects. Scenario B is Eθ = 0.25 and elasticity of wheat 
acres share with respect to wealth is -0.15. This table presents relative changes in acres in 
decimal form. For example, the number +0.0084 in the table corresponds to a +0.84% 
increase in crop acres (for wheat). Except for wheat acres under CRRA, hypothetical 
impacts of CAIS are relatively small. Since the sum of shares is identically 1, in principle off 
setting impacts are implied for the fourth crop, which is primarily oats. 
  
 Table 15  Short Run Impacts of CAIS (average data)  
  Wheat Acres  Barley Acres  Canola Acres 
  (A)  (B)  (A) (B) (A) (B) 
CRRA  -0.2262  -0.0549  -0.009 -0.0059 -0.031 -0.0204 
CARA  0.0084  -0.0455  0.0103 0.0056 0.0357 0.0194 
 
     Next we consider hypothetical long run impacts of CAIS on crop yields. As in the 
acreage demands, these calculations are based on average data for the 1966-2002 






assuming (A) Eθ = 0.3907, and to 7% increases assuming (B) Eθ =0 .25. Long run 
elasticities of yield with respect to price are estimated as +0.5306, +0.5310, +0.3203 for 
wheat, barley, canola, respectively. These lead to 4.56%, 4.73% and 2.79% increases in 
yield for wheat, barley and canola in scenario A and to 3.71%, 3.86% and 2.26% increases 
in yield in scenario B. The effects of price risk are quite small for wheat and canola, and 
somewhat larger for barley. 
 
Under CRRA, CAIS has a substantial impact on yields through changes in relative 
wealth. Although CAIS has only a minor effect on nominal wealth, a large reduction in 
effective prices implies a large increase in normalized wealth: 65% under scenario A and 
33% under scenario B. Moreover the estimated elasticities of wheat and barley yields with 
respect to wealth under CRRA are substantial: +0.4322 and +0.4395. This implies a 28% 
increase in wheat and barley yields through wealth effects (scenario A).  There are no 
wealth effects under CARA.   
      
There are no comparable studies estimating dynamic yield response to wealth, but 
we suspect that this study overestimates elasticity of wheat and barley yields with respect 
to wealth. An elasticity of +0.20 lies within the 95% confidence interval about these 
estimates, and this may well be more realistic than the reported estimates. This alternative 
elasticity implies a 13% increase in long run wheat and barley yield through wealth effects 
under CRRA (scenario B).  
      
Hypothetical long run impacts of CAIS on yields are presented in the following table. 
Scenario A is Eθ = 0.3907 and the econometric estimates of wheat and barley yield 
equations.  Scenario B is Eθ = 0.25 and elasticity of wheat and barley yields are +0.20. 
Results are in decimal form. 
  
 Table 16  Long Run Impacts of CAIS on Yields (average data) 
   Price  Price Risk Wealth Total 
Wheat  CRRA A  +0.0456  -0.0099 +0.0668 +0.0974 
  CRRA  B     +0.0371  -0.0065 +0.0668 +0.0974 
  CARA A      +0.0456  +0.0114 - +0.0570 
  CARA B      +0.0371  +0.0062 - +0.0433 
Barley   CRRA A  +0.0473  -0.0299 +0.2839 +0.3013 
  CRRA B   +0.0386  -0.019 +0.0668 +0.0858 
  CARA A  +0.0473  +0.0343 - +0.0816 
  CARA B  +0.0386  +0.0187  -  +0.0573 
Canola     CRRA A  +0.0279  -0.0114  -  +0.0165 
 CRRA  B +0.0226  -0.0075  -  +0.0151 
  CARA A      +0.0279  +0.0131 - +0.0410 







Induced long run changes in yields also have a feedback effect on acreage demands. 
These feedback effects of CAIS on acreages are indicated in the following table. These 
secondary  impacts of CAIS on acreage demands are obtained by multiplying  impacts in 
the above table by short run elasticities of acreage demand with respect to Er (expected 
revenues per acre) (or equivalently by differences between long run and short run  acreage 
responses in an earlier table). These effects are generally quite small. The exception is 
wealth effects on wheat and barley acreages under CRRA, scenario A, where impacts are 
+5.4%. 
  
Table 17   Acreage Feedback Effects of CAIS Impacts on Long Run Yields 
   Price  Price Risk Wealth Total 
Wheat  CRRA A  +0.0078  -0.0017  +0.0475  +0.0536 
  CRRA  B     +0.0063        -0.0011         +0.0114       +0.0166 
  CARA A      +0.0078       +0.0019            -  +0.0097 
  CARA B      +0.0063       +0.0010            -  +0.0073 
Barley   CRRA A  +0.0081        -0.0017         +0.0475       +0.0539 
  CRRA B   +0.0066        -0.0033         +0.0114      +0.0147 
  CARA A  +0.0081       +0.0019            -  +0.0100 
  CARA B  +0.0066       +0.0032            -  +0.0098 
Canola     CRRA A  -0.0093       +0.0033           -  -0.0060 
  CRRA B  -0.0075       +0.0025           -  -0.0050 
  CARA A      -0.0093       -0.0038            -  -0.0131 
  CARA B      -0.0075       -0.0024            -  -0.0099 
 
 
Hypothetical long run impacts of CAIS on wheat, barley and canola output are 
presented in the following table. This is the sum of impacts in the previous three tables. 
Scenario A is Eθ = 0.3907 and econometric estimates of yield and acreage equations.  
Scenario B is Eθ = .25, elasticity of wheat and barley yields with respect to initial wealth is 
+0.20, and elasticity of wheat acres with respect to wealth is -0.15. Scenario B may be 
more realistic. Results are in decimal form. In scenario B under CRRA, CAIS is calculated 
to have the following impacts on long run output: +5.91% for wheat, +9.46% for barley, and 
-1.03% for canola. In scenario B under CARA, impacts on long run output are +0.51% for 
wheat, +7.27% for barley, and +0.04 % for canola.  
 
 
Table 18  Long Run Impacts of CAIS (average data)  
  Wheat Acres  Barley Acres  Canola Acres 
  (A)  (B)  (A) (B) (A) (B) 
CRRA  +0.1423    +0.0591       +0.3462  +0.0946    -0.0205   -0.0103 







7.0 Extensions to Revenue Insurance Programs 
      
The theoretical analysis developed here presumably has implications beyond CAIS. 
In the U.S., farmers have been encouraged to rely more on subsidized insurance programs 
and less on direct government subsidies. Revenue insurance rather than income insurance 
programs are common. The above theoretical   analysis can easily be extended to revenue 
insurance programs, provided that an increase in current revenue for the individual farm 
can lead to a reduction in payouts to the farm, as is usually the case.  
      
First assume that output levels y are non-stochastic, as in the above CAIS model. 
Let R ≡ p y and C(w,y) denote revenue and  cost for the firm, and R
T is the insured level of 
revenue. Premiums can be viewed as embedded in the cost function. Assume a whole farm 
insurance program (the model can also easily accommodate crop specific programs, which 
are more common). So profits plus insurance payments are ψ = R - C + θ (R
T-R) = (1-θ)·R - 
C + θ R
T, where θ is the net share of payouts received by the firm. Most simply, θ = 1 if 
R
T-R > 0 and θ = 0 if R
T-R < 0. Since R is stochastic, θ is also stochastic. Then taking 
expectations Eψ = (1-Eθ) ER - C - cov(θ,R) + Eθ R
T where ER = Ep y assuming y is non-
stochastic. Then ∂Eψ/∂y = (1-Eθ) Ep - ∂C(w,y)/∂y - ∂Eθ/∂y  (R
T-R) - ∂cov(θ,R)/∂y . Under 
the insurance program, the expected shadow price for output is Epi* = (1-Eθ) Epi - ∂Eθ/∂yi 
(R
T-R) - ∂cov(θ,R)/∂yi whereas the shadow price for inputs is not influenced by the program: 
w* = w. Here it is quite possible that Ep*/w* < Ep/w, in contrast to CAIS. The analysis of 
components of Ep* is similar to CAIS. Thus such revenue insurance programs may have 
very different impacts on production than does CAIS, and may well lead to decreases in 
production. Apparently the effects of revenue insurance programs on shadow prices under 
risk have not been adequately recognized in the directly related literature   (e.g. Babcock 
and Hennessey; Hennessey, Babcock and Hayes; Wu and Adams).  
      
Second, assume that output levels y are stochastic and (for simplicity) output prices 
p are non-stochastic. The cost function can be defined as C(w,my,mω) = minx wx s.t. 
T(x,my,mω) = 0 where my are moments of output distribution and mω are moments of  
weather distribution (e.g. Pope and Chavas). Assume C =  C(w,my,mω) + e
c where Ee
c = 0 
(for simplicity). Then Eψ = (1-Eθ)  ER - EC - cov(θ,R) + Eθ R
T where ER = p Ey, EC = 
C(w,my,mω), and in turn ∂Eψ/∂Ey = (1-Eθ) p - ∂C(w,my,mθ)/∂Ey - ∂Eθ/∂Ey (R
T-R) -   
∂cov(θ,R)/∂Ey . The expected shadow price for output (Eyi) is  Epi* = (1-Eθ) pi - ∂Eθ/∂Eyi 
(R
T-R) - ∂cov(θ,R)/∂Eyi whereas the  shadow price for inputs is not changed by the 
program: w* = w. So again it is quite possible that Ep*/w* < Ep/w, in contrast to CAIS.  
      
Calculation of components of Ep* is more complex when y is stochastic. Assume a 
linear relation between θ and R: θ = α0 + α1  R + α2 Z + e (Ee=0), so ∂Eθ/∂Eyi = α1 pi. Then 
cov(θ,R) = α1  varR, where varR = p
T Vy p . So ∂cov(θ,R)/∂Eyi = α1 ∂varR/∂Eyi =  α1 Σj 






∂cov(θ,R)/∂Eyi apparently requires some econometrics. A multioutput stochastic 
transformation function T(x,my,mω) = 0 (e.g., a multioutput  generalization of a Just-Pope 
production function) can be  estimated. Then perhaps all ∂varR/∂Eyi can be calculated as 
shadow prices for the minimization problem min xp
T Vy p  s.t.   T(x,Ey,Vy,.,mω) = 0, Eyi = 
Eyi* i=1,.,N using the estimated  function T(.) and reference p, Ey.  
      
In crop insurance programs, payments for yield losses typically are conditional on 
acreage enrolments. Let xLA denote acreages enrolled in CI, and let xLB denote other 
acreages. Let yldI denote insured levels of yield and pA corresponding prices, and ρ is 
premium per acre. Define the cost relation C =  C(w,my,mω,xLA,xLB) + e
C where w excludes 
cropland market prices wL. Then ψ = p (yA+yB) - C - wL (xLA+xLB) - ρ xLA + θ pA (yldI -  yA/xLA) 
xLA . Taking expectations and differentiating with respect to EyA and xLA yields shadow 
expected prices for output and land under CI. These differ from market prices and imply 
that CI may decrease output. Early theoretical literature argued that CI would increase crop 
output, but more recent literature has recognized the ambiguity (Ramaswami; Chambers 
and Quiggin).  Empirical studies suggest that U.S. CI may increase acreages and reduce 




      
Econometric models of crop supply response typically estimate crop acreage 
demands. Such models presumably are adequate for measuring short run production 
response, but they are inadequate for the long run if there are significant long run yield 
responses to price.    
      
The first part of this study estimates a dynamic econometric model of crop yield 
response to price for Manitoba over 1960- 2002. Previous studies of crop yield response to 
price have ignored dynamics and risk aversion, and generally have not obtained statistically 
significant results. Here crop yields are specified as distributed lags of expected output 
price, output price variance, initial wealth and program insurance effects.  These are 
normalized by a crop input price index as implied by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
and mean variance or expected utility maximization. The model also includes measures of 
average weather conditions and heterogeneity of weather across Manitoba. Estimates of 
yield response to price are statistically significant, especially for the major crop, wheat. 
There are no comparable studies estimating dynamic yield response to economic variables, 
but we suspect that this study overestimates wheat and barley yield response to wealth. So 
a lower estimate is emphasized in simulating CAIS.   
      
A static econometric model of Manitoba crop acreage demands conditional on yields 






variances and covariances per acre (assuming only price uncertainty), initial wealth, 
program insurance effects, and a variance of weather indexes serving as a proxy for 
weather/yield uncertainty. The model adopts a normalization implied by CRRA, and the 
CRRA hypothesis is not rejected.    
      
A comparison of results for the two models indicates that in this case long run yield 
responses to price appear quite significant relative to short run acreage responses. This 
suggests that acreage demand models may well underestimate long run crop production 
response to price.  
      
The second part of this study develops a simple analytical model of crop production 
response to CAIS under risk aversion and output price uncertainty. Assuming CAIS has 
negligible impacts on domestic consumption impacts on production may approximate 
impacts on trade, i.e. trade distorting impacts. Hypothetical impacts of CAIS are simulated 
using an aggregate Manitoba data set over 1966-2002, which is prior to CAIS.  
      
Since increases in current income reduce current payouts under CAIS, CAIS has a 
substantial impact on shadow prices for outputs and inputs. Over the data set, effective 
prices for outputs increase by approximately 8% relative to effective input prices. Using 
estimates of the econometric model, this implies 4-5% increases in long run yields for 
wheat and barley and 3% for canola. CAIS has a small impact on nominal wealth. 
Nevertheless impacts on production depend critically upon properties of risk preferences. 
Under the production homogeneity condition implied by CRRA, the substantial change in 
shadow prices relative to nominal wealth implies, in effect, a substantial increase in relative 
wealth and in turn a substantial impact on production.  
      
Under more plausible assumptions, our simulation of  hypothetical long run impacts 
of CAIS on annual crop production over our 1966-2002 Manitoba data set are as follows. 
Under CRRA:  +6 % for wheat, +9 % for barley, and -1 % for canola. Under CARA:  +5 % 
for wheat, +7% for barley, and 0% for canola. These calculations primarily reflect impacts 
on long run yields, of increases in shadow prices of outputs, relative to inputs and (in the 
case of CRRA) increases in normalized wealth. Given estimates of the yield equation for 
canola, these impacts are negligible for canola. These impacts for wheat and barley are 
less substantial than simulated impacts for the historical Gross Revenue Insurance 
Program, which provided large and transparent subsidies to crop output prices.  
      
Two important caveats to these results are in order. First, this study plugs calculated 
hypothetical impacts of CAIS on relative expected prices, price uncertainty and wealth into 
an econometric model based on historical data. This is less reasonable for a complex 
program such as CAIS than for a transparent program such as GRIP. Nevertheless there 
does not appear to be an alternative dynamic approach based on econometrics, since there 






     
 Second, firm behaviour under CAIS is analyzed using economic theory of decision 
making under risk. However this standard theory may be too complex to approximate 
behaviour under CAIS, especially if the program is transitory. This is suggested by various 
counterintuitive results that we have derived under CRRA and utility maximization.    
      
Given these caveats, and the use of a synthetic data base, these results certainly do 
not imply that CAIS has significant trade distorting impacts on Canadian crop production. 
On the other hand, the analysis should further raise the possibility that CAIS is not a 
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 F-test of polynomial restrictions 
 
                                    F(2,28) = .3216                       no restrictions 














































































































































































































































































































 F-test of polynomial restrictions 
 
                                      F(6,19) = 1.09                       no restrictions 
 
                                      prob = .398 
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-6.9194 2.98  -1.1020 
 
5.99 













Table A - 3.  ADL Wheat Yield OLS (continued) 
 
 





























































 F-test of polynomial restrictions: 
 
                                                             F(6,26) = 2.218 
 
                                                    prob = .073 52 
 



















































































































































































































-.0001 0.47  -.0002 
 
1.26 










Table A-4.  DL Wheat Yield (continued) 
 
 





























































































































 F-test of polynomial restrictions: 
 
                                            F(10,10) = .925 
 




Table A - 5.  DL Wheat Yield 
 














































































































































































.1656 0.94 -.0418 
 
0.36 
  Constant    -9.1030 3.75 -6.0877 4.06 
 
















Table A - 5.  DL Wheat Yield (Continued) OLS 
Sum of lag coefficients:   
 
     Coef 
 
         t-stat 
 















































F-test of polynomial restrictions:  





Table A - 6.  ADL Barley Yield OLS 
 















































































































F - test of polynomial restrictions: 
F (2,28) = .727                                                                no restrictions
                                                   Prob = .492 
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Table A - 7.  DL Barley Yield  
































































































 -8.5936  3.60  -8.0972  4.38

























 2.27 2.03 
F - test of polynomial restrictions: 
F (6,19) = 1.790





















































































































































































F-test of polynomial restrictions 
 
                                         F(2,27) = 1.172  
 
                                                   prob = .325 59 
 
 
Table A - 9.  DL Oats Yield OLS 
 





































































































































































































F - test of polynomial restrictions: 
 














































































































































Crop Acreage Allocation Models 62 
 
 
Table B - 1. Wheat Acres Demand 
 
 A  B C 
  coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Er1  .1051 2.04 .1313 1.90 .1366 2.48
Er2  .0866 1.85 .1183 1.93 .1301 2.61
Er3 -.0702 2.13 -.0950 2.14 -.0552  1.56
Er4  .0409 1.60 -.0340 1.09 .0219 0.83
Vr1 -.0156 2.35 ------ -.0209  2.96
Vr2  .0001 2.32 ------ .0001 4.08
W1  .2582 4.07 .0263 0.53 .2375 3.50
Wo -.1577 3.65 ------ -.1581  3.40
TSVW1 .0009  0.10 ------ ------ 
TSVW2 .0156  2.67 ------ ------ 
TSVW3 -.0168 0.61 ------ ------ 
t  .0025 1.07 .0018 0.82 .0034 1.75
DLIFT -.1673 4.67 -.1853 3.57 -.1664  4.18
Constant 2.1707 3.75 -.2300 0.90 1.7928 3.05
R
2  .8677  .6513 .8170 
rho  .077  .500 .094 
DW  1.83  0.95 1.79 
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Table B - 2. Barley Acres Demand 
(first differences) 
 
  A OLS  B auto  C OLS  D OLS 
  coef t-stat Coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
Er1  -.0517 1.49 -.0542 2.22 .0370 1.19 -.0472 1.44 
Er2  .1024 2.57 .1246 4.14 .0862 2.78 .1050 3.13 
Er3  -.0291 1.29 -.0236 1.51 -.0305 1.49 -.0279 1.29 
Vr2  .0001 0.02 .0007 0.19  ------    -.0003 0.08 
Vr4  -.0068 1.30 -.0072 1.94  ------    -.0065 1.36 
Z  -.1692 1.98 -.1293 2.06 -.0987 1.41 -.1541 1.91 
Wo  .0065 0.30 .0007 0.04  ------    .0017 0.08 
TSVW1  -.0070 0.81 -.0023 0.31  ------    ------   
TSVW2  .0027 0.54 .0032 0.81  ------    ------   
TSVW3  .0063  0.23  -.0146  0.72  ------  ------  
t  -.0003 0.77 -.0001 0.13 -.0003 0.76 -.0003 0.74 
DLIFT  .0454 2.12 .0395 2.75 .0400 2.05 .0417 2.04 
Constant  .0062    .0005 0.05 .0050 0.58 .0058 0.62 
R
2  .3800  .4253  .3079  .3556  
rho  .212  -.064  .268  .265  
DW  1.45  1.99  1.39  1.35  
 64 
 
Table B - 3. Canola Acres Demand 
OLS 
 
 A  B  C 
  coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
Er1  .0312 1.12 .0157 0.52 .0132 0.55 
Er2  -.1339 6.01 -.1735 6.44 -.1402 6.15 
Er3  .0993 6.67 .0901 4.58 .1081 7.00 
Er4  .0191 1.53 .0133 0.92 .0270 2.16 
Vr2  -.0115 4.49  ------    -.0117 4.80 
Vr3  -.0052 2.43  ------    -.0063 2.92 
W1  -.0980 2.02 -.0108 0.25 -.0579 1.56 
W2  .0866 2.34 .0168 0.43 .0564 1.84 
Wo  -.0184 0.91  ------    -.0140 0.66 
TSVW1  .0049  1.04  ------  ------  
TSVW2  -.0056  2.49  ------  ------  
TSVW3  -.0089  0.66  ------  ------  
t  .0071 6.43 .0057 4.87 .0061 6.81 
DLIFT  -.0124 0.80 -.0191 0.87 -.0063 0.38 
Constant  -.0656 0.21 .1772 1.10 .0888 0.35 
R
2  .9848  .9602  .9803  
rho  -.036  .155  -.049  




Table B-4. Acres Demand SUR 
 
 Wheat  Barley (first differences) Canola
  coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Er1  .0931 1.89 -.0466 1.39 .0257 .096
Er2 .0877  1.94 .0973 2.54 -.1321  6.18
Er3 -.0804 2.52 -.0267 1.24 .0973  6.80
Er4  .0227 0.93 -- .0134 1.12
Vr1 -.0158 2.50 -- -- 
Vr2 --    .0019 0.42 -.0119  4.82
Vr3  --  -- -.0054  2.68
Vr4 --    -.0087 1.79 -- 
Vr12 .0001  2.35 -- -- 
W1 .2138  3.51 -- -.1081  2.33
W2  --  -- .0831  2.35
Z --    -.2318 2.93 -- 
Wo -.1229 3.00 .0045 .022 -.0078  0.41
TSVW1  .0025 0.30 -.0042 0.50 .0053 1.18
TSVW2 .0150  2.67 .0022 0.44 -.0056  2.62
TSVW3 -.0223 .085 .0055 0.21 -.0108  0.84
t  .0026 1.15 -.0003 0.78 .0072 6.82
DLIFT -.1624 4.63 .0546 2.63 -.0101  0.67
Constant 1.7735 3.22 .0069 0.70 -.1728  0.57
R
2  .8624  .3562 .9844 
rho  .174  .161 -.007 
DW  1.62  1.52 1.96 
BP-LM test for diagonal covariance matrix: χ2(3) = 9.052
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Table B-5. Acres Demand SUR 
 
 Wheat  Barley (first differences) Canola
  coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Er1  .1091 1.64 -.0343 1.14 .0165 0.56
Er2 .1358  2.32 .0677 2.26 -.1745  6.59
Er3 -.0972 2.27 -.0318 1.60 .0891  4.61
Er4 -.0419 1.42 -- .0143  1.00
W1 .0395  0.85 -- -.0167  0.42
W2  --  -- .0233  0.64
Z --    -.1133 1.71 -- 
t  .0017 0.83 -.0003 0.87 .0056 4.92
DLIFT -.1662 3.29 .0487 2.54 -.0192  0.89
constant -.2002 0.82 .0062 0.71 .1575 1.01
R
2  .2931  .2932 .9601 
rho  .511  .241 .155 
DW  0.92  1.44 1.68 




Table B-6 Acres Demand SUR 
 
 Wheat  Barley (first differences) Canola
  coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Er1  .1262 2.35 -.0453 1.42 .0102 .044
Er2 .1338  2.76 .0944 2.91 -.1399  6.44
Er3 -.0618 1.80 -.0304 1.47 .1058  7.16
Er4  .0063 0.25 -- .0221 1.84
Vr1 -.0200 3.01 -- -- 
Vr2 --    .0008 0.21 -.0123  5.33
Vr3  --  -- -.0062  3.07
Vr4 --    -.0078 1.72 -- 
Vr12 .0001  3.95 -- -- 
W1 .1942  2.94 -- -.0754  2.14
W2  --  -- .0564  1.96
Z --    -.2070 2.75 -- 
Wo -.1235 2.75 -.0024 .012 .0001  0.01
t  .0031 1.65 -.0003 0.88 .0060 6.97
DLIFT -.1596 4.07 .0494 2.48 -.0028  0.17
Constant 1.3667 2.41 .0076 0.81 -.0821  0.33
R
2  .8122  .3389 .9797 
rho  .167  .215 -.008 
DW  1.63  1.43 1.98 
































































  producer reference  Relative average government  government  
  margin  margin  Loss share of payments payments 
1966 3748.7  2371.6 0.000 0.000  0.000
1967 5658.9  2854.2 0.000 0.000  0.000
1968 2572.9  3324.1 -0.225 0.567  425.900
1969 2534.1  3324.1 -0.238 0.574  453.480
1970 2374.3  3259.5 -0.272 0.590  885.200
1971 2572.8  2951.9 -0.128 0.500  189.540
1972 4680.2  2560 0.000 0.000  0.000
1973 6799.7  2560 0.000 0.000  0.000
1974 9774.4  3262.4 0.000 0.000  0.000
1975 10007.7  4684.2 0.000 0.000  0.000
1976 5233.0  7084.8 -0.261 0.585  1083.310
1977 3038.0  7269 -0.582 0.697  2949.020
1978 6967.7  7269 -0.041 0.500  150.630
1979 6098.4  7325 -0.167 0.520  637.850
1980 5300.0  6099.7 -0.131 0.500  399.850
1981 2343.6  5543.8 -0.577 0.696  2227.350
1982 3959.0  4812.1 -0.177 0.531  452.970
1983 3103.4  5119.1 -0.394 0.648  1306.140
1984 4000.0  4120.8 -0.029 0.500  60.400
1985 2125.4  3687.5 -0.424 0.658  1027.840
1986 4572.7  3135.3 0.000 0.000  0.000
1987 -3332.1  3135.3 -2.063 0.668  4320.220
1988 -4085.5  3076.3 -2.328 0.660  4726.760
1989 -7969.6  931.1 -9.559 0.615  5473.950
1990 -2769.2  -1764.1 -0.569 0.600  1661.540
1991 -5135.0  -3395.6 -0.512 0.600  3080.990
1992 -7921.6  -4184.2 -0.893 0.600  4752.940
1993 -3162.1  -5713.9 0.000 0.600  1897.230
1994 -5320.0  -5406.2 0.000 0.600  3192.000
1995 202.4 -4539 0.000 0.000  0.000
1996 7259.2  -4539 0.000 0.000  0.000
1997 11708.3  -2759.9 0.000 0.000  0.000
1998 6835.4  1433.2 0.000 0.000  0.000
1999 1623.9  4765.7 -0.659 0.709  2275.510
2000 -45.5  5239.5 -1.009 0.739  3905.580
2001 11295.1  5239.5 0.000 0.000  0.000
2002 24809.5  6722.5 0.000 0.000  0.00070 
 
    
 MEAN ST.  DEV  
 producer  margin 3282.7 6164.1    
 reference  margin 2455.7 3847.4    
 Relative  Loss -0.574 1.6077    
  average government share of payments 0.39073 0.29706    
 government  payments 1284.8 1654.6    
    
    
  Correlation Matrix for Crop and Animal Prices    
 wheat 1    
 barley 0.91573 1    
 canola 0.84541 0.83948 1   
 oats 0.76591 0.89189 0.80742  1  
 flax 0.83867 0.81947 0.78893  0.77262 1  
 rye 0.87765 0.89176 0.85913  0.8041 0.81292 1  
 cattle 0.58088 0.63555 0.67731  0.7385 0.48716 0.49894 1  
 hogs 0.64508 0.62883 0.7655  0.66467 0.59798 0.55613 0.78262 1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 